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INTRODUCTION
Cognitive networking mechanisms prmnise to greatly improve network pelformance (v.hen compared to noncognitive mechanisms) by making more efficient use of bandwidth, spectrum, power, and so on. They also promise to greatly ease the task of network management by making networks self-aware and self-configuring. to some degree. These advances will benefit both military and civi1ian networks. Military networks. however, must remain robust and resilient in the face of cyberattacks weU beyond what is commonly seen in the civilian sphere. Furthermore, these attacks may be of a very sophisticated nature, or planned weU in advance. Such attacks may attempt to subvert network eqnipment at manufacture or in the supply chain (a lifeeycle attack), they may attempt to implant malicious/adversarial code on network equipment through so-called 'buffer overflows' (an injection attack), and they may attempt to subvert a legitimate operator of network equipment (the insider attack).
In all of these cases, a cognitive network may include legitimate participants who are actually acting in an adversarThis work is sponsored by the United States Army under Air Force Contract FA8721-0S-C-0002. Opinions, interpretations. conclusions and recommendations are those of the authors and are not necessarily endorsed by the United States Government.
ial manner. Although cognitive-networking mechanisms may tlchie\e high and improved performance in non-adversarial settings, this does not guarantee that the:' will rem:lin rubust an..:1 high-performing in :1d'.'cr3ari:ll ones. As v:c show in this p1per, in fact, cognitire-nct'-"orking mechanisms m~Ly t~ quite Hilnerable to ey;~n a single maFcious insider. As part of a recent collaboration between IvIlT Lincoln Laboratory and the u.s. Army CommunicatiLJlls-Electronic.s Research, De'-elopment, and Engin..;ering Center (CERDEC) into the security of cogniti':..;-nctworking lllcch::misms, v.'c analyzed the security of t\'.0 specific algorithms:
• The 'Q-routing' algorithm for packet-routing in mobile, ad-hoc networks [IJ, and The 'no regret' algorithm for dynamic spectrum anal-)'sis [3] . In both cases, we found that the performance of the algorithm can be significantly degraded for a large portion of the network by a single mis-behaving adversary. In this ~-ork, we 'describe these tv.'o algorithms and the single-pm1icipants attacks we found (Sections II and III). We finish with some observations and conclusions (Section IV).
II. Q-ROUTING

A. Background
At its core, the problem of packet routing in a mobile, ad-hoc network (MANET) routing is a sequence of simple local decisions. At each point in a packefs path from source to destination, an intermediate node comes into possession of the packet and makes a simple-sounding decision: which neighbor should receive the packet next? This can actually be quite difficult to determine in MANETs. First, the network topology of the MANET will change over time-sometimes quite quickly. What was once the 'best' neighbor in the past may not be the 'best' neighbor now. Second, the 'best' neighbor may not be the topologically nearest neighbor. Network congestion may saturate the capacity of links or nodes in a MANET, and so it may sometimes be 'best' to send the packet away from its destination in an effort to reach a less-saturated path. Lastly, the changing topology of a MANET means that the 'best' neighbor of the past may not even be a neighbor now. In this section, we consider one cognitive MANET-routing protocol: Q-routing.
B. The Q-routing algorithm
The Q-routing algorithm [1] is a machine-learning algorithm based on reinforcement learning. As opposed to other MANET-routing protocols (e.g.;Optintized Link State Routing (OLSR) [2]) the Q-routing algOlithm does not build spanning-trees of the MANET. Instead, each node in a Qrouting MANET requests (and trusts) a time-required-todeliver estimate from each of its neighbors.
Specifically, every node ni maintains a In that cell, n, will maintain a value which estimates how quickly a packet will reach destination d if
• the packet is given to ni, and • node ni passes it on to nj. This estimate will be the total of three components:
• The time it takes n,~ to process the packet (including the time it stays in ni'8 queue), • The time required for ni to transmit the packet to nj, and
• The time it takes for the packet to reach d after being received by nj. We illustrate Q-routing with a running example. Consider the MANET-neighborhood of Figure I . Node no maintains the table Q a, which is shown in part. We note that Qa{nb, nb) is fairly small, as are Qa{n e , ne) and Qa{nd, nd). This makes sense: once a packet for nb reaches na, the only time-consuming events remaining are (I) for the packet to make it through no's queue, and (2) for the packet to be transntitted to nb. The entry in Qa{ne, nb) is larger, as a packet for nb will take longer to reach nb if routed through ne first.
To route a packet for destination d, a node n, consults its to this value. To do so ntight make the algorithm overly responsive to transient changes in the network. Instead, node ni changes Qi(j, d) to be closer to this new estimate, and does so by applying a discount to the new information.
In particular, let the Q-routing algorithm be parameterized by a discount Jactor 0 :0; /1 :0; I. In this case, node ni adjusts the value in Qi(j, d) by the following amount:
In our running example, suppose that na queries nb about node no. Then nb queries its internal table Qb about the column associated with ne. (See Figure 2 .) The smallest value in this column is 12, and so nb returns d = 12 to na. Node na adds to this the latency of its own queue (8 = 4) and the transntission time for sending a packet to nb (t = 2) and artives at a new estimate of 18. The value currently in its table for Qa{nb, ne), however, is 20.
Suppose that this instance of Q-routing is running with a discount factor of /1 = !. 
It then applies this adjustment to Qa(n" n,) and ends ( Figure 3 ) with a new value of Qa(itb, n,) = 19.
C. Our attacks
In our security analysis of the Q-routing algorithm, "'e uncovered two 'denial-of-service' attacks which could be launched by a single subverted insider:
The 'random walk' attack: In this attack, the advers",), provides false 'distance' values for a particular destination. These values might be random values, chosen afresh each time. Alternately, they Can be chosen to slowly increase or decrease at a rate calculated to 'resonate' with the algorithm's discount rate. In both cases, the pUrpose of the false and challenging values is to prevent the underlying Q-learning algorithm from converging. In Figure 4 (taken from [I)) One can see the perfonnance of the Q-routing algorithm over time, for both light and heavy network loads. (The perfonnance of shortest-path routing is also included for comparison, though we do not need it for this discussion.) As one can see, the Q-routing algorithm displays extremely poor perfonnance at first, while the Q-learning algorithm is still learning the optimal routes. During this phase, packets are being routed more-or-less randomly (hence the name of this attack). ""hen the nlgorithm converges, on the other hand, perfonnance increases dramatically. The point of this attack, therefore, is to keep the algorithm from converging as long as possible (or to return the algorithm to a pre-conv.::rgence state). By changing its reported 'distance' Yalues, either randomly or accorcting to some algorithm. the adyersary may be able to accomplish this within some sphere of influence (determined by the discount rate), • The 'energy well' attack: in this attack, the adversary simply ad\"ertises a falsely-small distance to a fardistance destination. This false information eventually propagates to the adversary's neighbors, the neighbors' neighbors. and so on. Eventuany, nodes closer to the adversary than the destination will come to believe that the best route to the destination is to"'ard the adversary, which could actually be in the opposite direction from the actual destination. We note that this second attack may have long-lasting repercussions. Once the adversary has been able to establish the 'energy well: it has been encoded in the internal table of each fooled node. Even if the adversary is identified and removed from the network, the energy well will continue to exist. In fact, the energy well will continue to trap packets and distort network traffic until it is removed from the internal table of each affected node. Because each nnde updates its table based on reports from neighbors, and because these neighbors might also have been fooled by the adversary, the energy well will persist for some time. (Ultimately, it is the neighbors of the adversary that will begin to correct their internal tables first, and the effect will spread from the center of the well outward.) ,
D. Our recommendations
Although we do not focus on recommendations or mitigations in this particular work, we note that these attacks can be prevented through network-wide distribution (by each participant) of local information. For example, participants in the Optimized Link-State Protocol (OLSP [2]) broadcast (to the entire network) information about their immediate neighborhood l This information allows every node to construct a spanning-tree of the entire network. In the context of a Q-routing network, this additional information would allow participants to detect (and ameliorate) the above attacks.
III. NO-REGRET LEARNING
A. Background
The term 'dynamic specnum access' (DSA) refers to the notion that instead of being limited to a single frequency, a radio transmitter might wish to opportunistically 'jump' from frequency to frequency so as to maximize their ability to communicate. In this section, we consider the setting in which many 'peer' transmitters must share a rang~ of frequencies (broken into channels) over which they share equal c1a:im. 2 These users can use any of the available channels, or even multiple channels at once. These channels have finite capacity. however, and can be over-saturated if total usage exceeds their capacity. Furthenllore, channelswitching may be an expensive operation which the users wish to avoid as much as possible.
To maximize their efficiency, therefore, each user may wish to observe and predict the behavior of the other users. If it can predict the futUIe behavior of these other agents based on past behavior, then it may be able to identify channels with a high probability of being 'free' for long intervals. It can then use that channel (or a large fraction thereof) for its own communication while minimizing the costs of channelswitching.
B. The algorithm
In this section, we consider one algorithm for channelselection in this DSA setting. This algorithm [5] draws on an undedying result from game theory, showing that noncommunicating players can achieve a correlated equilibrium in a repeated game [4] . To apply this result to dynamic spectrum access, setting is modeled as a game wherein the participants are the players and each strategy represents one possible usage of channels. That is, a strategy would have the player to use channel 1 with rate rlo channel 2 with rate T2. and so on, for some rb T2, ... 1t is assumed that rates I We note that the authors of the Q-routing algorithm also consider describe a variant algorithm which incorporates this sort of neighborhoodwide communication [1, Section 3.2]. However, their discussion of this variant is motivated by performance concerns rather than security concerns.
IThe tenn 'dynamic spectrum access' can also be used in a setting in which some frequencies are licensed to 'primary' users who use them only infrequently. Therefore, they are often available to be used opportunistically by 'secondary' users. We do not consider this setting in this paper.
ri are discretized, and so there are only finitely many rates from which a player might choose. It is further assumed that there are a finite number of channels, leading to a finite number of strategies.
The 'reward' received by each player in the game is proportional to their total throughput over all channels, which is the sum of their throughput on each channel. Their throughput on a given channel. furthermore, is proportional to the rate they choose for that channel-unless the sum of rates on that channel exceeds its capacity. In this case, the throughput of the channel drops to zero, and the players receive no utility from that channel in the outcome of that round. 3 It is in each player's interest, therefore, to use as much as possible of each available channel so long as the channels do not become oyer-subscribed.
Lastly, we note that the gamc is a repeated game, meaning that secondary users play the above game in each round"in an infinite series of rounds. Howeyer, players can adapt their strategies bet\\-een rounds. and can do so based on preyious rounds.
Once the DSA setting is represented as a game, the algorithm of this section (presented by [5] , which simply refines the more-general algorithm of [4] for the DSA setting) attempts to bring this game to an equilibrium: an assignment of strategies (rather, probability-distributions over all possible strategies) to players with the following property: no player can independently (unilaterally) act to increase the overall utility of all players, so long as all other p1ay~rs obey thcir assigm:d distribution. Specifically, th~ algorithm attempts to find a correlated equilibrium, which is a type of equilibrium in which the players are given possiblycon-elated signals as to the strategies to select. In particular, each player is given their own individual signal, but these signals may be correlated with each other. If the signals are completely uncorrelated, the resulting equilibrium will be a Nash equilibrium. If the signals are correlated, however, the resulting equilibria may produce better overall perfonnance than can be produced by Nash equilibria. In our setting, the semi-common signal is simply the history of previous rounds, and this is enough for the algorithm of [4] to achieve correlated equilibrium-given that the game is unchanging and number of rounds is sufficiently long.
To achieve correlated equilibrium a completely distributed manner, each participant performs a sequence of computations at each round. Specifically, it will compute the regret it currently associates with each strategy. The regret of a strategy is defined to be the difference between two values:
• The total utility the node would have 'received' from the game over all previous rounds had it followed its current strategy each previous round, and • The total utility the node would have 'received' from the game over all previous rounds had it followed the strategy in question each previous round.
The first value is subtracted from the second, and negative values are rounded up to zero. In both cases, the past actions of all other players remain unchanged, To illustrate this with an example: suppose that a game has just finished its third round, and that participant P is cUlTcntly using strategy So. To calculate the regret it associates with another strategy 810 it first computes ty~'O values:
First, the utility it would have received had it followed strategy 80 for all previous rounds (which mayor may not have been the case). For the sake of completeness, let us suppose that it would have received utility 1 in round 1, utility 3 in round 2, and utility 3 in round 3. 4 Strat..:gy So then would h..l\'c generated total utility 7. Then, the participant computes the total utility that would have been generated by strategy $1. With this strategy, the pat1icipant would have generated utility 1 in round 1, utility 1 in round 2, and ut~1ity 2 in round 3. Thus, strategy 81 would have generated total utility 4.
With these two numbers, the pmticipant calculates its regrd for strategy 81. Because strategy 81 would have generated less utility (4) than with its current strategy (which generated utility 7), strategy 81 is assigned a regret of o.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the participant also evaluates the regret assigned to another strategy 82. For the purpose of this example, suppose that this strategy would have generated utility 3 in round 1, utility 2 in round 2, and utility 4 in round 3. Its total utility is 9, which is lar,5:er than the utility generated by the CUlTent strategy. The regret assigned to 82 i~ the difference between the two utility-totals:
If the node associates a positive regret with a strategy, than the node would have been 'better off' adopting that strategy from the beginning. To choose its next strategy, then, the node samples from the following distribution: Let s be the strategy used in the previous round. Then:
• A strategy 8' '" 8 is assigned a probability proportional to its associated regret, (The proportionality constant is chosen at the beginning of the game in such a way so as to ensure that the sum of these probabilities is less than one,) • The strategy • is assigned all 'left over' probability mass.
To return to our example, recall that the current strategy of participant P is '0, and that strategies '1 and '2 have regret o and 2 assigned to them, respectively, Let us further assume 4Why arc these values not all identical? Because the other participants shifted their strategies from round to round, thus changing the utility of strategy So. that strategies '3, 84 and '5 have been assigned regrets 3, 4 and 5, respectively, and that these are all possible strategies.
To assign a probability to each strategy, the participant retrieves its proportionality constant. This constant, C, was chosen by the participant at the beginning of the game in such a way so as to be larger than any possible sum of regrets, With this constant, the participant assigns probabilities in the following way:
• S1' probability o.
• 82: probability 2/c.
• 83' probability 3/c, • 84' probability 4/c, • Ss: probability 5/c,
• So: all remaining probability mass (1 _ 2+3+4+5). c It then chooses a strategy for next round according to this distribution.
We note that because the constant c ofthis cX~llTlple is chosen to be large (so as to ensure that the probabilit;' assigned to 80 will be positive) assigned to strategies 82 through 85 may be quite smalL Despite this, it is shown (in [4] ) that : this procedure will 'almost surely' converge to correlated eqUilibrium for any game. The specific application of this algorithm to DSA channel selection is demonstrated in [5], along with simulation results demonstrating improvements of 5% to 15% over other gamc-theoretic results.
C. Our attack
As mentioned abuve, this algorithm is vulnerable to a simple 'denial of service' attack which can be launched by a single subvelied participant. We motivate this attack through a simple: example:
Supf'ose that a system of parti..:ipants has reacherT. com·er-gence, and was been in convergence for some time t. (For the sake of simplicity, suppose that the system has been in convergence for its entire history.) Further suppose that during this time, participant P has used the simple strategy s of using only channe1 c. By doing so, it has receiyed utility u per round, and therefore received cumulative utility ut.
Now, suppose at time t that the adyersary 'floods' channel c, This means that participant P will receive no utility by using channel c, It should switch to a new channel, therefore, and wilL But when? Before the participant will switch, it needs to establish that it 'regrets' not using some other strategy Sl. To compute its regret for 8', it computes two values:
• The cumulative utility it has received so far, and • The cumulative utility it would have received by purely following .' from the beginning of history (assuming that all other participants remain as they were),
For the participant to compute positive regret for s', it must be the case that the second value outweighs the first, But when will this be the case?
Let us make the simplifying assumption that strategy s'
will yield the participant utility u' (where u' < u) per round, In this case, let us compute the two values above' as they would be computed by the participant at some time t' ~ t:
• Cumulative utility actually received: the pal1icipant will have received utility ut until time t, and no utility after that. Thus, a total utility of ut.
• Cumulative utility from strategy Sf: utility u' for every round, making a total cumulative utility of u't'. Thus, the participant will only 'regret' not using strategy S' when u't' 2: ut Thus, the participant will only switch when t' ;:: ~t. If, for example, u' = ~u, then the participant will only switch when tf = ~t. If u' = ~, then the participant will only switch when tf = 2t. In general, the larger the difference between u and u', the longer it will take the participant to switch from strategy s to strategy s'.
This example demonstrates a more general phenomenon: the longer the system has been in convergence, the longer participants will wait to react to disruption. We also confirmed this notion through simulation. By simulating a simple system (three users, two channels), we have been able to demonstrate this intuition experimentally. Figure 5 displays the results. In this experiment. the original system was allowed to come to convergence and to stay in convergence for some number of rounds n. At round n, one of the participants (the adversary) unilaterally increases their use of the channels. When this happens, the two remaining participants will begin to receive sub-optimal utility. They will need to re-a1locate the remaining bandwidth between themselves so as to maxituize their payouts, which will canse the system to leave convergence. Our simulation allows the system to continue until the two honest participants reconverge to their new, optimal strategies.
Let n' be the number of rounds required to re-converge (which is measured from round n, not round 0). Figure 5 displays n' as a function of n. As can be seen, the longer that a participant has been relieving optimal utility from a convergent system (n), the longer it is willing to tolerate sub-optimal utility before it will switch strategies (n').
Multiple attacks can leverage this characteristic of the regret-based learning system. First, the adversal}, can apply the simple strategy of our simulation: simply flooding the channels used by a participant of interest. It tuight also use the 'window of opportunity' to iterate through all possible strategies to find the most disruptiye one. Lastly, it can attempt to prevent the system from conv..:::rging or rcconv~rging by changing its strategies periodjcall~'.
D. Our recommendations
The above attacks are pOSSible h . . . . cause of how algorithn1; participants regard the past. In pruticular, when participants decide how much'regret' to associate with a particular strategy, they compute the total utility thc~' would have rc~civcd with that strategy over their entire history. Specifically, the utility they would have receiyed in the first round is considered to be on par with the utility they would haye receiyed in the immediately-previous round, no matter how long ago the first round had been. Put another way, the participants of this protocol do not discount the past. To mitig2.te this attack, we recommend that the definition of 'regret' be modified to value the immediate past more highly than the distant past. This can be accomplished by simply applying a discount factor which increases oyer time, or to simply consider a sliding window which encompasses only the most immediate past.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, Wi:: considered two cognitive-networking mechanisms-Q-routing for packet-routing in MANETS, and a game-theoretic algorithm for DSA-and demonstrated how both could be subverted by a single malicious insider. This is not to say that both algorithms are inherently vulnerable; both algorithms could be modified to be resistent to the described attacks. (Q-routing could be augmented with some sort of network-wide information-distribution in the style of OLSR, and the DSA algorithm could be modified to react more quickly to disruption.) Nor should this work be interpreted as saying that all cognitive-network algorithms are vulnerable to insider-attacks. However, both attacks described in this paper are enabled by a key aspect of many cognitive-network mechanisms: that networkparticipants trust other network participants to be acting honestly. By doing so, these cognitive-network mechanisms can more quickly react to new information, or can find optimal configurations which cannot be reached through purelylocal decisions. However, these attacks do demonstrate that cognitive-network mechanisms must be analyzed from a security standpoint before being implemented and deployed on military networks.
